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Financing sustainable development in Africa requires financing options that is best for 
development in the region without further escalating other societal problems. This chapter 
takes stock of financing options previously advocated for financing development in the 
African region such as development assistance and foreign investment. By considering its 
implication on development outcomes like poverty, inequality, and aggregate human 
development, some drawbacks still exist. Therefore, the chapter identifies, reconfigures and 
reinvents other financial flows such as mutual support networks, agricultural cooperatives, 
crowd funding, fiscal responsibility, other forms of informal banking, and remittances, among 
others to African countries for efficient provision of structures that can aid in the sustenance 
of development. We conclude that these alternative means of financing development could be 
a viable policy option to bridge income and development gaps; thereby mainstreaming the 
process for financial inclusion and sustainability. 
 
Keywords: Finance; Sustainable Development 














Sustainable development in Africa, which includes the ability to meet present economic, 
social and environmental needs without compromising the capacity of future generations to 
meet their own prevailing needs, will require enormous economic resources to fund it. This 
implies that there must be a clear balance of prioritization of financing options on what works 
best for development in this region without further escalating other societal problems. The 
vast majority of the literature has focused on traditional financing means such as development 
aid (Alesina and Dollar, 2000), Foreign Direct Investment (Velde, 2006), even remittances 
from migrants (Maphosa, 2007), and to a large extent, foreign debt from bilateral and 
multilateral institutions (Chipumbu, 1993; Omotola and Saliu, 2009).  
 
The puzzle in this chapter is not that the current means have not favored African development 
– because it has, but that a significant fraction of these funds has not been channeled for 
development structures that will facilitate sustainability. For instance, Kharas (2007) notes 
that despite the magnanimous flow of foreign aid to developing countries, a significant 
number of them channel these funds to debt forgiveness and other unprecedented natural 
occurrences, leaving out issues like infrastructural development and even education and 
health care development. Also, Safiq, Mansoon & Rafique (2013) observed that apart from 
national debts and inflation that continuously threaten the gross domestic product (GDP) of 
developing economies, foreign direct investment negatively affects economic performance. 
The limiting prospects of foreign funds for financing sustainable development is largely 
hampered by government instability, internal and external conflict, corruption and ethnic 
tensions, bureaucracies, unresponsiveness and unaccountability of government (Busse & 
Hefeker, 2007) 
 
This chapter, therefore, sets out findings from an examination of the traditional funding 
options that African countries have relied on overtime, and then discusses new funding 
options by taking cases on how they have worked in specific African countries. For instance, 
issues like empowering cooperative societies and mutual support networks, agricultural 
cooperatives, crowdfunding, fiscal responsibility, other forms of informal banking 
alternatives, were considered for sustainability in Africa. These issues are essential 
considering that the set-up of African countries is unique and the specific structures are 
different from countries in other regions (Asiedu, 2002; Nkume, 2018), and policies that work 
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in other regions may not be adaptable for this region because the circumstances and informal 
institutions (i.e. the foundations on which policies thrive) differ so much.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is distributed as follows: the next section discusses the trends in 
traditional means of financing development in Africa, which is followed by the linkage 
between these means of financing development and key indicators of human development. 
The fourth section discusses some relevant case studies of other financing options that can fit 
the development trajectories of African countries, while the fifth section concludes the paper 
with policy recommendations.  
 
2. Trends in Traditional Financing Option for African Countries 
The level and composition of this alternative financing means has changed markedly over 
time, which implies development, which will be discussed subsequently. Despite the 
increasing flow of finances to the African region, there is still the need for alternative 
financing means considering the issues surrounding these traditional means of financing, 
which will be discussed later. This section, therefore, presents the traditional finance means 
based on a historical perspective, and compares the trend with other regions of the world. 
Considering the inflow of official development assistance1 at constant 2015 US$ to countries 
in the African region (and compared to other regions) as seen in Figure 1, there has been a 
reasonably stable increase in the volume of this financial flow compared to other regions. In 
absolute terms, there has been about a fourfold increase in the value of this development 
assistance since 1975, from 11.9 billion to 45.8 billion in 2015.  
Countries in other regions do not experience such a stable increase in foreign aid flow as 
compared to countries in the SSA region, as seen in Figure 1. Seeing the trend of foreign aid 
flow for MENA for instance, there is a sharp decline from about 30.1 billion in 2005 to 
approximately 12.7 billion in 2012, after which there was an improvement in the volume. The 
countries in the other regions like South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the East 
Asia and the Pacific all had a steady, but marginal, rise in aid flows. When compared to the 
value that flows to the SSA region, there is about fivefold difference in the value of aid flows 
to SSA countries compared to the value in East Asia and the Pacific countries.  
                                                        
1Which are those monetary transfers from wealthy nations and rich countries to poorer countries that are broadly 
corresponding to low and middle income countries for development related issues like education, infrastructural 
development, and health care growth in the recipient countries? However, it is important to also note that foreign 
aid covers a multitude of different types of transfers - not all of which go directly to poor countries (Kharas, 
2007). For instance, other administrative overhead costs of development agencies, and their domestic efforts to 
advocate in favor of more assistance, are also regarded as “aid.”  
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Figure 1: Aid Flow to SSA and some other Regions of the World 
 
Notes: ODA is defined as Net official development assistance and official aid received (constant 2015 US$). 
SSA- Sub Sahara Africa; MENA – Middle East and North Africa; SA – South Asia; LAC – Latin America and 
Caribbean; EAP – East Asia and Pacific 
 
Meanwhile, the ODA flow to African countries in 2014 was highest in Ethiopia and Egypt, 
comprising about 7 percent of the total ODA flow to the region from Table 1. The remaining 
countries like Kenya, Tanzania, and Nigeria all received about 5 percent of the total foreign 
aid flows to the region, and Congo, Morocco, Mozambique, and South Sudan received 4 
percent inflow. In comparison, the rest countries in the region received less than 3 percent of 
the total aid flow. The United States of America was the highest aid donor to the region, with 
the European Union countries giving about 12 percent of the total aid flow. The aid direction 
to the SSA region is unevenly dispersed with the top 10 recipients receiving about 47 percent 
of the entire aid flow to the region. The implication of this skewed aid flows could indicate 
that some countries are not only more privileged or positioned for such opportunities, but 
could also have an edge in funding requirements compared to other countries that have not 
received. Therefore, in addition to considering alternative funding paths for sustainable 
development, it is worthwhile for donors to consider the direction, spread and even nature of 
their donations.  
Table 1: Aid flow and Aid Donors to African Countries 
Top 10 ODA receipts by recipient  Top 10 ODA donors  
 USD million, net disbursements in 2014  USD million, net disbursements in 2014  
Ethiopia 3585 7% United States 9338 17% 
Egypt 3532 7% EU Institutions 6737 12% 
Kenya 2665 5% IDA 6386 12% 
Tanzania 2648 5% United Kingdom 4346 8% 
Nigeria 2476 5% United Arab Emirates 3787 7% 
Democratic Republic of Congo 2398 4% Germany 3018 6% 
Morocco 2247 4% France 2929 5% 
Mozambique 2103 4% African Dev. Bank 2042 4% 
South Sudan 1964 4% Global Fund 1957 4% 




















Other recipients 28941 53% Other Donors 12098 22% 
Unlike foreign aid, the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the African region has 
been a low trend in the past two decades compared to other regions; and more recently, the 
region has witnessed even more decreases. Generally, compared to other regions of the 
World, countries in SSA (for instance) see less foreign investment flow, which is about 13 
times lower than those flows to EAP in 2015 alone.  
Figure 2: Trend in Foreign Direct Investment (Net inflows) across Regions 
 
Notes: SSA- Sub Sahara Africa; MENA – Middle East and North Africa; LAC – Latin America and Caribbean; 
EAP – East Asia and Pacific 
Countries in Africa are still expected to receive less foreign investment compared to those in 
other regions when considering the projection of foreign investment flow across regions in 
Table 2. From Table 2, the foreign investment flows to Africa are estimated to increase by 
about 19 per cent in 2018 to $50 billion from 42 billion in 2017. Despite this increase, African 
countries are seriously lagging when compared to countries in other regions. The projection 
for Africa is bolstered by the expectation of a continued fair recovery in the prices of 
commodities in the international market (despite that commodity-dependence will cause FDI 
to remain cyclical), and by favorable macroeconomic fundamentals (UNCTAD, 2018). 
Importantly, the recent signing of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) by 44 
African countries could encourage a more improved FDI flows.  
Despite the benefits embedded in FDI inflows for developing economies, the observed pattern 
of FDI inflows into the African continent courts urgent concerns as a dependable and 
sustainable source of financing. Apart from FDI being an outward and unpredictable form of 
finance for developing economies, governments within host economies have no control 
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whatsoever on the capitalist choices of when and where to invest. Thus, owing to the 
volatility of this form of financing, the onus lies on developing economies to stir real 
endogenous economic growth. Studies have further proven other funds such as remittances as 
more predictable then FDI (Vaknin, 2008; Büthe & Milne, 2008). Therefore, rather than 
depending on external funding sources, it is imperative that developing economies are more 
inward looking via indigenous and frugal approaches to financing, production and economic 
outputs. Vaknin (2008) also noted that FDI does not necessarily metamorphose to net foreign 
exchange inflows given that some Multinational Corporations (MNCs) borrow from local 
funds at appreciable interest rates to finance their investment; thereby, constituting further 
threats to local firms and crowds-out domestic firms from credit opportunities. Meanwhile, 
Büthe & Milner (2008) add that variations in FDI inflows are largely attributed to 
international trade agreements than local/host agreements or policies such as General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade, World Trade Organisation (WTO) and African Continental 
Free Trade Area (AfCTA). This is because international commitments are passed as more 
worthwhile than local policies; thus, leaving host economies largely at the dictates of foreign 
investors especially where their activities are not so consistent with local objectives.  
Table 2: FDI Inflows, Projections (2015–2018) in Billions of Dollars and Percent 
 
2015 2016 2017 2018* 
World 1921 1868 1430 1450 to 1570 
Developed Economies 1141 1133 712 740 to 800 
Europe 595 565 334 380 
North America 511 494 300 320 
Developing Countries 744 670 671 640 to 690 
Africa 57 53 42 50 
Asia 516 475 476 470 
Latin America and the Caribbean 169 140 151 140 
Note: * is the 2018 projected value. 
Source: UNCTAD (2018) 
Another source of foreign revenue inflow to Africa is remittance inflow, which is one of the 
most stable forms of foreign capital to African countries. For instance, unlike foreign aid and 
foreign investment that depend on the economic condition of the originating countries, 
remittance inflow remains stable, in terms of its volume, considering that it includes those 
monetary flows sent to the home countries by nationals for different purposes, including 
altruistic motives, investments, and other human capital development funding. Despite, 
remittance inflow to African countries still considerably lower than those of other regions of 
the world (see Figure 3), over the years, there has been a consistent increase in the trend of 
global remittance inflow, which makes this form of foreign capital flow to be an important 
source of countries developing funding option. 
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Figure 3: Remittance Inflow across Regions 
 
Notes: SSA- Sub Sahara Africa; MENA – Middle East and North Africa; SA – South Asia; LAC – Latin 
America and Caribbean; EAP – East Asia and Pacific 
Considering the combined distribution of the three most important sources of foreign 
financial inflow to African countries as presented in Figure 4, we see from the trend that, as 
earlier noted, official development assistance is still the most important foreign capital flow to 
the region. As at 2016 alone, the volume of official development flow to African countries 
was about 19 percent more than remittance inflow and about 16 percent more than the total 
foreign direct investment. In terms of stability of the flows, Figure 4 shows that the trend of 
remittance inflow is smoother than the other funds, which confirms the earlier assertion that 
remittance inflow is more stable than the other funds.  
 
As laudable as remittances appear, the flow to SSA has been adjudged as low when compared 
to the flows in other regions of the world like LAC and EAP. In addition, the sustainability of 
this capital source is a puzzling phenomenon given that   remittances are largely dependent on 
a number of factors such as family reunification, immigration policies, (Docquier, Rapoport 
& Salomone, 2012) continual viability of the remitter or remitting organization and the host 
economy. Meanwhile, the remittance decay hypothesis which captures the remitting 
behaviour of migrants argues that the amount of remittances sent by migrants to their 
countries of origin declines through time. While some studies have validated the remittance 
decay hypothesis (Chami, Fullenkamp & Jahjah, 2005; Arun & Ulku, 2011; Makina & 
Masenge, 2015); others have argued otherwise in favour of the remittance theory (Docquier, 
Rapoport & Salomone, 2012, Hunte, 2004). Irrespective the direction of argument, the 
budding issue of interest within this chapter is the reliability and sustainability of this source 
of finance; hence, the subsequent section delves more into funds that emanate locally and are 












































































































Figure 3: Remittance Inflow across Regions 
 
 
3. Linkage: Traditional Finance Means and Key Indicators of Human Development 
When observing the relationship between the different indicators of financial flow and 
development, it is important to consider the type and volume of these financial flows because 
the impacts they have on the recipient countries depend on these characteristics.  However, 
this study is not a rigorous examination of the importance of these financial flows, hence our 
inquiry is to observe the pairwise association between the different financial flows (especially 
the most popular ones in Africa) and the indicators of human development as suggested by 
the UNCTAD (2016) while taking into consideration health care and per capita income in the 
respective countries.  
 
Figure 4: Scatter Plot – ODA, FDI, and Infant Mortality (2015) 
 
 
In Panel A of Figure 4: 
- upward association between ODA and infant mortality in the sampled countries- suggesting 


















































































































Swanson (2015) argued that aid directed at helping poor countries might be hurting and 
slowing their growth  
 
-FDI to African countries, reduces under-five mortality rate; suggesting that FDI can assist 
and not necessarily hurt the recipient countries. 
- African countries receive less of this form of foreign capital flow compared to other regions 
of the world 
 
The findings from this plot support the consensus in the literature that advocates for foreign 




Figure 5: Scatter Plot – ODA, FDI, and Per Capita GDP (2015) 
 
 
Another important development outcome that we consider in this section is the per capita 
income of African countries, which is a measure of the average income level of the 
population. Using a similar sample as presented in Figure 4, the scatter plots for the per capita 
GDP and the different financial flow indicators are in Figure 5. Foreign aid flow still 
maintains a significant negative relationship with per capita GDP of the respective countries 
in the African region, implying that this form of financial flow does not have a positive effect 
on the income level of the recipient countries in the region. In sharp contrast, we find a 
positive relationship between the volume of foreign direct investment and the income level of 
the respective African countries. This suggests that the average income of the population of 







The negative relationship seen between foreign aid and the measures of development, and in 
contrast, seeing a positive relationship between foreign investment and the measures of 
development further reiterates the need to consider financing sustainable development in 
Africa effectively. The traditional mechanisms of finance do not consistently show an 
improvement in the measures of development, which reinforces the need to consider 
alternative means of financing sustainable development in Africa – which will be broadly 
discussed in the subsequent session. Finally, it is fair to say that there is an  immense body of 
literature that criticizes the ability of foreign aid to deliver its development outcomes in the 
recipient countries. For instance, these studies point to the fact that international politics, 
governance and heightened public sector corruption is a major factor to be considered in 
ensuring the effectiveness of foreign aid in recipient African countries (see Kaufmann, 2009; 
Bauhr, 2016; Kenny, 2017). 
 
4.   Alternative Path for Sustainable Development in Africa 
There are different alternatives, and more stable funding means that can help the sustainability 
of African countries. These alternative funding means have been used by some non-African 
countries and has worked in so many instances with accrued benefit and cost. However, when 
considering the cost, in relation to the cyclicality of the traditional means of finance, which 
was earlier elaborated in the document. The first funding option for African countries to 
consider is the sovereign wealth fund (SWF) as finely elaborated in Nkume (2018). SWF, 
which are those investment funds in real and financial assets like stocks, bonds, real estate, 
precious metals, or in alternative investments like private equity funds or hedge funds that are 
managed by the State. These SWF are expected to be funded by excess revenue from 
commodity exports or foreign reserves that are held by the central bank to be used for future 
development projects.   
 
African countries are beginning to think in this direction, especially with the increasing 
number that subscribes to this important funding option. According to Nkume (2018), 
countries like Algeria, Botswana, Libya, Ghana, Angola, Senegal, Tanzania, Kenya, and 
Mozambique, with countries like South Africa still in the process of assessing  how the SWF 
would be structured in their economies. Taking Nigeria, for instance, there is a Nigeria 
Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) set up to manage this fund through the excess 
earnings from crude oil. The mechanism of operating this account is such that the NSIA 
receive monthly funding of a significant portion of the excess oil and gas revenue above the 
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budgeted revenue (NSIA, 2018), with the three sovereign funds under the NSIA being future 
generation funds, Nigerian infrastructure fund, and stabilization fund. Apart from Nigeria, the 
SWFs contribute about 40 percent of Botswana’s and 100 percent of Libyan gross national 
income and even makes-up a quarter of Algerian national income (Fourie, 2016). To ensure 
these funds are effectively managed and to reduce the incidence of rent-seeking and 
corruption practices that plague other traditional means of funding development, there is the 
need for such funds to be administered by an independentfinancial body. 
 
Another important concept to consider in funding sustainable development is the awakening 
of responsible state capacity in driving the development process in African countries. 
Unfortunately, most political leaders in African countries are short-term thinking, and many 
lack strategic ideas in propelling the development process of their respective countries (Jo-
Ansie, 2007; Efobi, 2015). This has to change for there to be sustainable development in the 
continent. Reinventing responsible state capacity is all about the state being involved in 
deciding strategic competencies, and then enabling the private sector to get involved in such 
competencies. A vivid example of a country where this has worked is Brazil: in the 1970s, the 
government pursued an aggressive export-oriented industrialisation strategy by identifying 
sectors that they wanted to build competencies in (i.e. non-ferrous metals, chemicals and 
petrochemicals, paper, and machinery and equipment) and then mobilised Brazil’s national 
bank to offer medium- and long- term financing to projects initiated by the private sector in 
these competencies. This initiative was successful in establishing a thriving steel industry in 
Brazil, which has boosted their export performance, and there has been an efficient 
development of other industries as a result of this initiative such as the automobile industry 
and even the aero industry. Brazil greatly contributes to the global supply chain of aircraft, 
which is a significant industrial revolution that places them among the fast-emerging 
economies of the world (UNCTAD, 2016).  
 
India also have a similar success story like Brazil, where the State got involved in the 
development of specialised financial institutions which were tasked with the responsibility of 
providing long-term finance to specific industries that were identified as strategic for national 
development (Chandrasekhar, 2015). In some other instances, the Indian government engaged 
in state-owned enterprises to develop such competencies, which then spilled over to an 
industrial revolution. For instance, Amsden (2001) records that there were technological and 
human capital investments undertaken by the state had a great impact on local firms through 
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the supply of trained workforce in the specific industry that the government got involved – in 
this case, the pharmaceutical industry. A similar spillover was also recorded for Ethiopia, 
where certain technologies that were first initiated in the state-owned enterprises were later 
adopted and advanced by the private sector (UNCTAD, 2016). 
 
The miracle of cooperative societies and informal mutual support network is another 
important alternative source of funding development in African countries. Unlike the formal 
financial institutions, the informal support networks are a form of pool funds by members to 
provide a type of insurance for its members in cases of cyclicality, and in cases where huge 
funds are needed for investment needs (see Mangasini, 2018).   
 
5. Conclusion 
Sustainable development in Africa includes the ability to meet present economic, social and 
environmental needs without compromising the capacity of future generations to meet their 
own prevailing needs. However, achieving these development goals will require enormous 
economic resources. Hence, the need to balance the prioritization of financing options based 
on what works best for development in this region. Indeed, there have been beneficial 
outcomes from some of the finance means: for instance, while we find negative relationship 
between foreign aid and some development outcomes, foreign direct investment was found to 
have positive association with similar development outcomes. We therefore argue for the 
consideration of other finance means like improving the effectiveness of mutual support 
networks, sovereign wealth funds, improving state capacity to chart the development course. 
We conclude that despite the importance of traditional means of financing development in the 
African region, their wide spread impact on non-mainstream groups (like those involved in 
the informal sector, rural populace, and even the disadvantaged group) is not effectively felt; 
hence, the rising rate of inequality and exclusive development. However, these alternative 
means of financing development could be a viable policy option to bridge these gaps; thereby 
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